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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a theoretical model that can analyze the impact of gender inequality on 
long-term economic growth. The model is calibrated to fit to the Korean data. We find that 
gender equality policies lowering discrimination in the labor market or increasing the time 
spent by a father on child rearing can contribute positively to female labor market 
participation and per capita income growth. The simulation results show that if the disparities 
at home and in the labor market between men and women are completely removed, the 
female labor force participation rate increases from 54.4% to 67.5%, and the growth rate in 
per capita income rises from 3.6% to 4.1% on average over a generation.  
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1. Introduction  
 
South Korea has made significant economic progress in the past 50 years, as 
demonstrated by its increase in per capita income from mere USD 80 dollars in 1960 to more 
than USD 24,000 in 2013. A critical factor for Korea’s economic success has been its fast-
growing well-educated labor force. From 1960 to 2010 the share of adults who have 
completed secondary schooling or higher soared from 20% to an impressive 87% in 2010 
(Barro and Lee, 2013).  This abundance of well-educated workers has brought higher levels 
of labor productivity and returns on investment, and provided capabilities to facilitate 
technological adoption and innovation. In this way, cheap and good-quality labor has served 
as the foundation for Korea’s successful export-oriented development strategy. 
During its rapid industrialization and development period, Korea has made substantial 
strides toward gender equality in terms of opportunities in education and employment. The 
gender gap in enrollment ratios at secondary schools and advancement rates to higher 
education is now negligible. The presence of women in such elite professions as law, 
medicine, and high-level civil service is more noticeable than ever before. 
However, a significant gender gap in labor market participation still exists. According 
to OECD data, only 55% of Korean women aged 15-64 are in the labor force compared to 65% 
for OECD countries on average. It lags substantially behind the male participation rate of 
about 77%, which is close to the OECD average of 79%.  
The labor force participation rate of Korean women shows an M-shaped pattern over 
the life cycle due to a significant drop in their 30s that results from a career interruption after 
marriage or child birth. While the Korean labor market is likely to eventually encourage 
active female participation, child rearing remains a major obstacle for highly educated and 
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able female workers who want to continue their career, as mothers are primarily responsible 
for raising children. Inflexible working environments and a lack of affordable, good-quality 
childcare facilities make it challenging to balance work and home.  
Korean women have in general a strong perception on the existence of gender 
inequality in various parts of the society. According to the 2002 Social Survey by Statistics 
Korea, 72.4 percent of women generally believed the existence of gender inequality in 
Korean society. Indeed, according to a report on the global gender gap by the World 
Economic Forum, Korea was ranked 111th in 2013 (Table 1). This index takes into account 
women’s general position in (i) economic participation and opportunity, (ii) educational 
attainment, (iii) health, and (iv) political empowerment. 
The Korean government is aiming to change this, according to the 3-year plan for 
economic innovation announced last February. Its major goal is to increase the female 
employment rate from the current 54% to 62% by 2017 through, among other measures, 
providing affordable, good-quality childcare facilities and expanding paid parental leave, 
which would help female workers remain in the workforce.  
The objective of this paper is to assess the output cost of gender inequality and the 
impacts of gender-based policies on female labor force participation and long-term economic 
growth in the Korean economy.  
A key source of inequality between women and men in labor force participation stems 
from the way women allocate their time. At all levels of incomes, Korean women tend to do 
the majority of housework and childcare, and correspondingly, spend less time on market 
work. There still exists significant gender discrimination in the labor market.  
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We present a model, which is built on one in our companion paper (Kim, Lee and 
Shin, 2014), that accounts endogenously for women’s time allocation between home 
production, child rearing, and market work, and analyze how gender inequality at home and 
in the labor market effects female labor force participation and economic growth. We then 
calibrate the model to fit its steady state values to the observed values from Korea and 
conduct simulations to quantitatively measure the opportunity cost of gender inequality in 
terms of output foregone, and the impacts of gender-based policies on females’ labor market 
participation and economic growth.  
There is an increasing body of literature on gender equality and growth.1 Existing 
theoretical literature emphasizes three channels through which gender equality influences 
growth— female labor market participation, average human capital stock and fertility. A 
considerable number of empirical papers investigate the impact of gender inequality in 
education and employment on economic growth and the majority of them find the adverse 
effects of gender inequality on economic growth.   
As gender inequality has been a pressing issue lately in the Korean society, many 
Korean researchers have studied various aspects of female labor supply and household work, 
mostly in microeconomic perspectives. Kim and Sung (2007), Woo (2008), Cho (2009) and 
Choi (2011) estimate empirically or by model calibration the labor supply function of Korean 
women to investigate the effects of various government policies such as subsidies for 
childcare and earned income tax credits. Kim and Cho (2003) and Kim (2012) study the 
determinants of labor market reentry by married women after childbirth or childcare leave, 
                                           
1 See Kim et al. (2014) for a succinct survey of recent papers. 
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including several gender-related policies. Huh (2008) examines the factors for time spent on 
household production by men and women.  
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no academic research that assesses the 
effects of gender inequality on economic growth in the context of the Korean economy in 
macroeconomic perspectives. This paper tries to fill in this gap. This paper proceeds as 
follows. Section 2 provides an overview of gender issues in Korea. Section 3 introduces the 
formal model. We calibrate the model and derive the benchmark steady state characterized by 
balanced growth path. In section 4, we experiment the effects of gender equality policies and 
estimate the output cost of gender inequality. Section 5 provides concluding observations. 
 
2. Gender Inequality in Korea 
There are various dimensionssocial, cultural, and economicof inequality that 
modern Korean women are facing. In a long term historical perspective, the gender inequality 
problem has been improving greatly since the takeoff of Korean economy in 1970’s. 
However, it is still true that Korean women have many hurdles to leap over for equal 
treatment at various corners of the society.  
On a positive note, the educational achievement of women in Korea has improved 
substantially in the last half century. In 1990, the average years of schooling for Korean 
women in their 30’s were 10.4 while the average years for men were 11.8. The schooling 
years rose to 13.9 for women and 14.1 for men in the year of 2010. Furthermore, the average 
schooling years for women in their 20’s in that year reached 14.3 which were even higher 
than that for the male counterpart at 13.9 years (Social Indicators in Korea, Statistics Korea).  
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The general improvement in gender equality has been manifested by the change in sex 
ratio at birth. At the peak of its rise, the sex ratio at birth (measured by the number of boys 
born per 100 girls) reached 116.5 in 1990. The ratio fell down to the normal level of 106 as of 
2007. It is widely believed that rising sex ratio at birth was mainly due to gender inequality in 
the Korea society. Now the sex ratio coming down to the normal level, Korean parents may 
not perceive any disadvantage for their daughters in the future. 
Albeit several indications of improvement in gender equality, we do still witness 
significant inequality between men and women in various aspects in Korea.  
 
2.1 Gender gap in labor force participation rat 
 Despite rapid economic growth and catch-up to advanced economies since 1970’s, 
labor force participation of Korean women has been still lagging behind that of women in 
developed countries. The female labor force participation rate (LFPR) in Korea is still one of 
the lowest among OECD countries: the female LFPR in Korea was 12.3 percentage points 
lower than the U.S. in 20122.  
 The female labor force participation rate in Korea is significantly lower than the male 
counterpart, and this gap is larger than that in most OECD countries. According to OECD 
statistics, in 2011, the difference in LFPR between men and women was 11 percentage points 
in the U.S., 12.5 percentage points in the U.K., 17.5 percentage points on average in all 
OECD countries, and 23.4 percentage points in Korea. The gender gap in LFPR has been 
quite persistent over time in Korea. 
                                           
2 See OECD, http://stats.oecd.org 
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 The gender difference in LFPR is more announced when we investigate the 
participation by marital status. In 2011, married men in Korea had the LFPR at 82.8 percent 
while single men had the rate at 52.2 percent. On the contrary, the LFPR’s of married women 
and of single women in Korea in that year were 49.3 percent and 50.9 percent, respectively.  
 The falling LFPR of married women in Korea is well documented in the so-called M 
curve of labor supply over life cycle. When we plot the employment rate of different cohorts 
in Korea, we find a dip in the employment rate for Korean women in their 30’s unlike Korean 
men showing no decrease (see Figure 1). 
Significantly lower labor market participation by married women in Korea is viewed 
as a reflection of large burden of childcare on married women. The Korea Time Use Survey 
conducted in 2009 reports that time spent by a wife on average is more than 3 times longer 
than a husband (55 minutes per day vs. 14 minutes).  
The gender gap in LFPR is also more pronounced among the highly educated. 
According to the Annual Report on the Economically Active Population Survey by Statistics 
Korea in 2011, the LFPR of Korean men with university education or more was 88.3 percent 
while the female counterpart had 62.9 percent. This difference among the more educated is 
disturbing because it implies a significant waste of human resources for Korean economy. 
 
2.2 Gender gap in employment rate 
 The female employment rate varies a lot across educational groups. According to 
Statistical Yearbook of Education by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, the 
employment rate (ER) among female high school graduates in 2011 was 27.3 percent, which 
was higher than the employment rate among male high school graduates (20.2 percent).  
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However, the order of the employment rate of men vs. women among the more 
educated is reported to be reversed. In 2011, the ER’s of men and women with masters 
degrees or higher were 80.6 percent and 59.4 percent, respectively. On the other hand, the 
ER’s of men and women with bachelor degrees were 58.7 percent and 50.0 percent, 
respectively. This suggests that about half of female college graduates who are provided 
adequate skills for the labor market are not contributing in the economy, which can be 
considered an economic loss for Korea. 
The gender gap is reported to exist not just at the quantitative dimension of 
employment, but also at the qualitative dimension. Table 2 below shows the male-female 
difference in employment types. For example, in 2011, only 3.2 percent of all women 
employed owned their own businesses while 8.4 percent of men did so. The fraction of 
temporary workers among women was almost twice higher than that among men (28.7 
percent vs. 15.0 percent).  
 
2.3 Gender gap in wage 
Another gender difference we observe in terms of economic performances pertains to 
the wage rate in the labor market. The average monthly wage which is measured by adding 
the monthly salary and the monthly installment of annul bonus income is reported to be 3.2 
million Korean won for men and 2.0 million won for women in year 2010 (Survey on Labor 
Conditions by Type of Employment, 2010, Ministry of Employment and Labor). This implies 
that Korean women on average earn 64 percent of what Korean men earn.  
It is true that the wage gap has become smaller since the economic takeoff in Korea. 
According to the Surveys on Labor Conditions by Type of Employment in various years, the 
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female-male wage ratio was 0.47 in 1985 and 0.63 in 2000. Our concern in this regard is that 
the gap is still substantial nowadays and it has been quite stable (without a narrowing trend) 
since the early 2000’s.  
The gender gap in wage is smaller for more educated women, but the gap is still 
considerable: women with bachelor degrees or higher earned about 66 percent of what men 
with the same degrees earned in 2010 (Survey on Labor Conditions by Type of Employment, 
2010, Ministry of Employment and Labor).  
Interestingly, the wage gap between men and women is more pronounced in 
occupations that require more advanced skills. In 2010, those women with professional 
occupations such as medical doctors and attorneys earned only 61.7 percent of what the male 
counterparts earned when 64 percent was what Korean women earned on average (Survey on 
Labor Conditions by Type of Employment, 2010, Ministry of Employment and Labor).  
 
2.4 Women’s representation in political and government sectors 
Beyond the gender inequality in economic aspects, there are concerns raised in other 
areas such as political representation of women and their participation in the government 
sector.  
Delegates in the 18th National Assembly who were elected in 2008 include only 41 
women out of 299 seats in total, which is merely 14 percent. This was a significant 
improvement from earlier elections. For example, in the 14th National Assembly elected in 
1992, the female fraction was 1 percent (3 out of 299 seats). However, considering more than 
half of the Korean population consists of women (50.1 percent in 2010 to be exact), they are 
still remarkably underrepresented in the political arena.  
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Compared to the political sector, women seem to be better represented in the 
government sector. In 2010, the fraction of female government employees at the federal 
government level was 41.0 percent. This share is still significantly below 50 percent, 
nonetheless.  
It is also recognized that Korea women are not well represented at the administrative 
levels of private and public firms. According to the survey conducted by GMI Ratings (2013), 
the fraction of women in corporate boards is 1.9 percent in Korea and 11.8 percent in OECD 
countries, putting Korea at the rank of 43 out of 45 countries surveyed. They also find that 
19.5 percent of corporations with more than 100 employees have no female executive at all. 
 
2.5 Government policies on gender inequality 
The Korean government has been implementing various policies to improve the 
welfare of women in Korea and reduce gender inequality. Another parallel objective of these 
policies is to encourage childbearing as the aging of the Korean society has been accelerated 
in the last few decades with extremely low fertility rates.  
With these policies, the Korean government aims in general to provide better 
environment for child bearing and child rearing so that women are willing to reproduce and 
able to return to the labor market. The policies can be categorized in three types.  
The first type includes those policies to help women giving birth and lower the cost of 
childbearing for couples.3 They are: 
(i) Maternity and paternity leave (for childbirth) 
                                           
3 See the homepage of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family inKorea 
(http://www.mogef.go.kr/index.jsp)  
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(ii) Childcare leave of absence (for children age 0-6): maximum of 1 year with 
pay 
(iii) Reduced work hours during child rearing (for children age 0-6): maximum of 
1 year combined with child care leave of absence 
The second type of policies pertains to providing parents more reliable childcare 
facilities for children in grade schools.  
(i) Incentives for firms to provide childcare centers at work: implemented in June 
2013 
(ii) Providing public childcare centers 
(iii) Financial support for childcare 
(iv) Encouraging private and public childcare centers with financial incentives to 
offer flexible hours for childcare: implemented in July 2014 
The last type is to give incentives for firms to hire back women after child births or 
child care. Currently private firms can receive tax subsidies if they employ female workers 
who are trying to return to the labor market after childrearing. 
To some extent, these policies have been successful in promoting female labor market 
participation. For instance, the female employment rate among women age 15 and over rose 
above the 50 percent mark in 2014 (50.4% to be exact) for the first time (Economically 
Active Population Survey, 2014). However, the female employment rate is still significantly 
lower than that in many advanced economies such as Canada (69.2%), Japan (60.7%), and 
Sweden (71.8%). This still leaves a lot of room for the Korean government to implement 
better policies for encouraging female labor supply. 
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3. The Model  
 
The theoretical model has a three-period overlapping generations (OLG) structure 
where various aspects of gender inequality are related to the growth performance of the 
economy. Based on a similar model, Kim et al. (2014) showed that improving gender equality 
can contribute significantly to economic growth by changing female’s time allocation and 
promoting accumulation of human capital. 
In order to apply to the Korean economy, we modify the model introduced in Kim et 
al. (2014) in the following ways. First, besides market and home production, males allocate 
their time to child rearing and education. This modification will be essential to examine 
government policy that encourages males to spend more time in child rearing. Second, we 
assume that father’s education level as well as mother’s education level determines 
accumulation of education by children. This change as well as the change in the first 
modification that males allocate time to education will allow us to investigate the perfect 
gender-equality case where males and females behave exactly in the same way. Third, we 
remove the bias toward sons in time allocation and relative preference for children’s 
education. This modification reflects that in the Korean society, the bias for sons almost 
disappears. Finally we will assume that the government also spends on unproductive usage. 
This will allow us to explore the government policy that switches spending from 
unproductive usage to education. 
 
3.1. Model Structure 
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In the economy, every individual lives for three periods: childhood, adulthood (at 
middle age) and retirement (at old age). There is a continuum of identical families consisting 
of parents born at time (t-1) and children born at time t. The family’s utility function at time t 
is as follows: 
      𝑈𝑡 = 𝜂𝑐
1
1 − 𝜎
𝑐𝑡
1−𝜎 + 𝜂𝑞
1
1 − 𝜎
𝑞𝑡
1−𝜎 
+𝜂𝑒 [
1
1−𝜎
((
𝑛𝑡
2
)
𝛿
𝑒𝑡+1
𝑚 )
1−𝜎
+
1
1−𝜎
((
𝑛𝑡
2
)
𝛿
𝑒𝑡+1
𝑓 )
1−𝜎
] +
𝑝𝐴
1+𝜌
1
1−𝜎
𝑐𝑡+1
1−𝜎   (1) 
where 𝑐𝑡 (𝑐𝑡+1) is the family’s total consumption in parents’ adulthood (parents’ retirement), 
𝑞𝑡 consumption (and production) of home goods, 𝑛𝑡 the number of children (of which half 
are sons and the other half daughters), 𝑒𝑡+1
𝑚  (𝑒𝑡+1
𝑓 ) the education level of sons (daughters) 
which will determine the efficiency of male (female) adult workers at t+1, ρ > 0 the time 
discount rate, 𝜎−1 the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and 𝑝𝐴 the probability of 
survival from adulthood to retirement. The coefficient 
j
C  is relative preference for today’s 
consumption, 𝜂𝑞  relative preference for the home-produced good, and 𝜂𝑒  relative 
preference for children’s education. 
We assume that the female adult divides her time into four uses: market production, 
home production, child rearing and child education. Thus the time constraint for the female is 
as follows: 
  ℎ𝑡
𝑤 + ℎ𝑡
𝑞 + ℎ𝑡
𝑅 + ℎ𝑡
𝑒 = 1       (2) 
where ℎ𝑡
𝑤 is the female adult’s time allocated to market production, ℎ𝑡
𝑞
 her time allocated to 
home production, ℎ𝑡
𝑅 her time allocated to child rearing and ℎ𝑡 
𝑒  her time allocated to child 
education.  
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We assume that  
ℎ𝑡
𝑚𝑞 = 𝑓1ℎ𝑡
𝑞         (3) 
where ℎ𝑡
𝑚𝑞
is the male adult’s time allocated to home production and 𝑓1 represents the 
bargaining power of a female with respect to home production. Equation 3 implies that the 
decision on time allocation to home production by the male and the female is made in two 
steps: first, the decision on the female’s time allocated to home production is made and then 
second, the bargaining power of a female determines the male’s time allocation to home 
production proportionately. The bigger the bargaining power is the female’s, the higher is the 
proportion. For simplicity, we assume that 𝑓1 is exogenously determined and constant. 
Generally 𝑓1 < 1 and the perfect equality is obtained if 𝑓1 = 1. This two-step decision 
makes us to focus on the female’s decision only and hence simplifies the problem. We will 
make the same assumption for the time allocation to other uses. 
We assume that ℎ𝑡
𝑅 = (2 − 𝑓2)𝑣𝑛𝑡  where 2𝑣  is rearing time needed per child. 
Again the male’s time allocated to child rearing is  
ℎ𝑡
𝑚𝑅 = 𝑓2𝑣𝑛𝑡        (4) 
where 𝑓2 represents the bargaining power of a female with respect to child rearing. 𝑓2 is not 
necessarily equal to 𝑓1 since the comparative advantage of the male and the female in these 
activities are not the same. In general the female has more comparative advantage in child 
rearing particularly if child rearing also involves breast feeding. 
 Finally the time allocated to education satisfies ℎ𝑡
𝑒 = 𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒 where 𝜖𝑡
𝑒 is average 
education time spent for each child. We assume that the female allocates her time equally 
between sons and daughters. The male’s time allocated to child rearing per child is 
determined by 
14 
 
𝜖𝑡
𝑚𝑒 = 𝑓3𝜖𝑡
𝑒         (5) 
where 𝑓3 represents the bargaining power of a female with respect to child education. Hence 
the total time spent on child education by the male is ℎ𝑡
𝑚𝑒 = 𝑓3𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒. 
Then the time constraint faced by the female can be represented as follows: 
 ℎ𝑡
𝑤 + ℎ𝑡
𝑞 + (2 − 𝑓2)𝑣𝑛𝑡  + 𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒 = 1      (6) 
The home production function is 
 𝑞𝑡 = ?̅?(ℎ𝑡
𝑞 + ℎ𝑡
𝑚𝑞)𝛾[(𝑒𝑡
𝑓)
𝜒
(𝑒𝑡
𝑚)1−𝜒]= ?̅?(1 + 𝑓1)
𝛾(ℎ𝑡
𝑞)𝛾[(𝑒𝑡
𝑓)
𝜒1
(𝑒𝑡
𝑚)1−𝜒1]  (7) 
where 𝑒𝑡
𝑓
 and 𝑒𝑡
𝑚 are the education level of mother and father, and the second equality 
holds because of (3). We assume that time spent by a male is perfectly substitutable for time 
spent by a female. However, we assume that the education of a female and a male is 
introduced as a Cobb-Douglas functional form where 𝜒1 and 1 − 𝜒1 are output elasticity of 
female and male education. 
The education level of children that will become productivity when they become 
adults is determined by three factors, the average government spending on education per 
(surviving) child, a mother’s human capital 𝑒𝑡
𝑓
 and the time mothers allocate to each child, 
as follows:4  
 𝑒𝑡+1
𝑓 = 𝑒𝑡+1
𝑚 = ?̅?(
𝜇𝐺𝑡
𝑛𝑡
𝑎𝑁𝑡/2
)𝜈1[(𝑒𝑡
𝑓)
𝜒1
(𝑒𝑡
𝑚)1−𝜒1]1−𝜈1((1 + 𝑓3)𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝜈2        (8) 
where 𝐺𝑡  is total government spending, 𝜇  an indicator of efficiency of government 
spending, 𝑁𝑡 the number of individuals of generation t and 𝑛𝑡
𝑎  the average number of 
                                           
4 The formulas for children’s human capital do not include the role of private education spending. However, the  
mother’s time can be interpreted as comprising private educational spending. The model can be extended to 
include the allocation of family income to education of children, though the solution of the model becomes 
much complicated. 
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children in the households. Since we assume the representative household, 𝑛𝑡
𝑎 = 𝑛𝑡 holds in 
equilibrium. 
The household budget constraint at t and t+1 are
5
: 
𝑐𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐻             (9) 
𝑐𝑡+1 =
(1+𝑟𝑡+1)𝑠𝑡
𝑝𝐴
             (10) 
where τ ∈ (0,1) is the tax rate, 𝑠𝑡 saving, 𝑟𝑡+1 interest rate between t and t+1, and 𝑤𝑡
𝐻 
total gross wage income for the household. 
𝑤𝑡
𝐻 = 𝑒𝑡
𝑚ℎ𝑡
𝑚𝑤𝑤𝑡
𝑚 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑓ℎ𝑡
𝑤𝑤𝑡
𝑓
 
 = 𝑒𝑡
𝑚(1 − 𝑓1ℎ𝑡
𝑞 − 𝑓2𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑓3𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝑤𝑡
𝑚 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑓(1 − ℎ𝑡
𝑞 − (2 − 𝑓2)𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝑤𝑡
𝑓
      (11) 
where ℎ𝑡
𝑚𝑤 = 1 − ℎ𝑡
𝑚𝑞 − ℎ𝑡
𝑚𝑅 − ℎ𝑡
𝑚𝑒 is the time allocated by the male to market production. 
In this expression, 𝑒𝑡
𝑚ℎ𝑡
𝑚𝑤 and 𝑒𝑡
𝑓ℎ𝑡
𝑤 measure labor supply by male and female adults in 
efficiency units, and 𝑤𝑡
𝑚 and 𝑤𝑡
𝑓
 are effective market wages for male and female adults 
respectively. 
The household maximizes the utility (1) with respect to 𝑐𝑡, 𝑐𝑡+1, ℎ𝑡
𝑞
, 𝜖𝑡
𝑒, and 𝑛𝑡 
subject to the constraints (2)-(11). The first order conditions for 𝑐𝑡 and 𝑐𝑡+1 implies that 
(
𝑐𝑡+1
𝑐𝑡
)𝜎 =
1+𝑟𝑡+1
𝜂𝑐(1+𝜌)
             (12) 
It is useful to derive the saving rate from (12) as follows: 
 θ
𝑡
= 1 −
1
1+
𝑃𝐴
1+𝑟𝑡+1
(
1+𝑟𝑡+1
𝜂𝑐(1+𝜌)
)1/𝜎
         (13) 
                                           
5 As in Kim et al (2014), we assume that the savings made by adults who do not survive to old age are 
confiscated by the government and equally distributed in lump sum to the surviving adults when they become 
old. Hence the return rate of saving, 
(1+𝑟𝑡)
𝑝𝐴
 is higher than the actual interest rate, 1 + 𝑟𝑡. 
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Market output is produced by identical firms whose number is normalized to unity. 
Each identical firm i’s production function takes the following form: 
𝑌𝑡
𝑖 = ?̅?(𝐸𝑡
𝑚𝐻𝑡
𝑚𝑤𝑁𝑡
𝑚,𝑖)𝛼(𝐸𝑡
𝑓𝐻𝑡
𝑤𝑁𝑡
𝑓,𝑖)𝛼(𝐾𝑡
𝑖)1−2𝛼        (14) 
where α ∈ (0,1) is the elasticity of output with respect to male and female effective labor 
that is assumed to be the same. Since the representative firm hires labor from the labor 
market, it hires male and female workers with average labor productivity (education level) 
𝐸𝑡
𝑚 and 𝐸𝑡
𝑓
, respectively.  The average male and female adult’s time allocated to market 
production is denoted by  𝐻𝑡
𝑚𝑤 and 𝐻𝑡
𝑤 and the numbers of male and female workers are  
𝑁𝑡
𝑚,𝑖
and 𝑁𝑡
𝑓,𝑖. Finally 𝐾𝑡
𝑖  is the amount of capital stock employed by firm i. 
Profits of firm i are represented as follows: 
 Π
𝑡
𝑖
= 𝑌𝑡
𝑖 − (𝑤𝑡
𝑚𝐸𝑡
𝑚𝐻𝑡
𝑚𝑁𝑡
𝑚,𝑖 + 𝑤𝑡
𝑓𝐸𝑡
𝑓𝐻𝑡
𝑤𝑁𝑡
𝑓,𝑖) − 𝑟𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝑖       (15) 
where the price of the marketed good is normalized to unity and 𝑟𝑡 the rental rate of capital 
that is identical to the rate of return to savings. The firm, taking input prices as given, 
maximizes profits with respect to the number of male and female workers and capital.  
As in Kim et al. (2014), we assume that there is discrimination in the labor market 
against female workers: while male workers receive their marginal product, female workers 
receive a faction d ∈ (0,1) of their marginal product. We assume that profits accrued due to 
female discrimination in the labor market are thrown away by the firm. Then the optimal 
choices of the firm for labor and capital satisfy the following equations: 
 𝑤𝑡
𝑚 =
𝛼𝑌𝑡
𝑖
𝐸𝑡
𝑚𝐻𝑡
𝑚𝑤𝑁𝑡
𝑚,𝑖, 𝑤𝑡
𝑓 =
𝑑𝛼𝑌𝑡
𝑖
𝐸𝑡
𝑓
𝐻𝑡
𝑤𝑁𝑡
𝑓,𝑖, 𝑟𝑡 = (1 − 2𝛼)
𝑌𝑡
𝑖
𝐾𝑡
𝑖   (16) 
In equilibrium, 𝑁𝑡
𝑚,𝑖 = 𝑁𝑡
𝑚 ,  𝑁𝑡
𝑓,𝑖 = 𝑁𝑡
𝑓
and 𝐾𝑡
𝑖 = 𝐾𝑡  for all i and the aggregate 
output is, 
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 𝑌𝑡 = ∫ 𝑌𝑡
𝑖1
0
= ?̅?(𝐸𝑡
𝑚𝐻𝑡
𝑚𝑤𝑁𝑡
𝑚)𝛼(𝐸𝑡
𝑓𝐻𝑡
𝑤𝑁𝑡
𝑓)𝛼(𝐾𝑡)
1−2𝛼   (17) 
From (14) and the equilibrium conditions, the following relation holds between 𝑤𝑡
𝑚 
and 𝑤𝑡
𝑓: 
𝑤𝑡
𝑚𝐸𝑡
𝑚𝑤𝐻𝑡
𝑚 = 𝑑−1𝑤𝑡
𝑓𝐸𝑡
𝑓𝐻𝑡
𝑤      (18). 
In equilibrium the following equations hold: 𝑒𝑡
𝑚 = 𝐸𝑡
𝑚 , 𝑒𝑡
𝑓 = 𝐸𝑡
𝑓
, ℎ𝑡
𝑚𝑤 = 𝐻𝑡
𝑚𝑤  and 
ℎ𝑡
𝑤 = 𝐻𝑡
𝑤. 
The government finances its expenditure on education, 𝐺𝑡 and on unproductive 
usage, 𝑈𝑡 by taxing the wage income.6 We assume that the expenditure on the unproductive 
usage is proportional to that on education: 𝑈𝑡 = ∅𝐺𝑡. Further we assume that the government 
budget is balanced every period: 
 𝐺𝑡 + 𝑈𝑡 = 𝜏(𝐸𝑡
𝑚𝐻𝑡
𝑚𝑁𝑡
𝑚𝑤𝑡
𝑚 + 𝐸𝑡
𝑓𝐻𝑡
𝑤𝑁𝑡
𝑓𝑤𝑡
𝑓)     (19) 
where 𝜏 is the tax rate of government expenditure. Then  
(1 + ∅)𝐺𝑡 = 𝜏(𝐸𝑡
𝑚𝐻𝑡
𝑚𝑁𝑡
𝑚𝑤𝑡
𝑚 + 𝐸𝑡
𝑓𝐻𝑡
𝑤𝑁𝑡
𝑓𝑤𝑡
𝑓)     (20) 
or  
(1 + ∅)𝑔𝑡 = 𝜏(𝐸𝑡
𝑚𝐻𝑡
𝑚𝑤𝑡
𝑚 + 𝐸𝑡
𝑓𝐻𝑡
𝑤𝑤𝑡
𝑓)     (21) 
where 𝑔𝑡 ≡
𝐺𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝑓 =
𝐺𝑡
𝑁𝑡/2
. 
In equilibrium, from (16) and (18) 
(1 + ∅)𝑔𝑡 = 𝜏(𝐸𝑡
𝑚𝐻𝑡
𝑚𝑤𝑡
𝑚 + 𝐸𝑡
𝑓𝐻𝑡
𝑤𝑤𝑡
𝑓) = 𝜏(𝑒𝑡
𝑚ℎ𝑡
𝑚𝑤𝑡
𝑚 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑓ℎ𝑡
𝑤𝑤𝑡
𝑓)=τ(1+𝑑−1)𝑒𝑡
𝑓ℎ𝑡
𝑤𝑤𝑡
𝑓
 
= 2𝜏(1 + 𝑑) 𝛼
𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑡
       (22) 
                                           
6 The model can be easily extended to allow non-distortionary revenue financing public education expenditures 
or unproductive government spending reallocated to education sector. This extension will produce more positive 
contribution of an increase in government education spending to economic growth.  
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or 
(1 − ∅)𝐺𝑡 = 𝜏(1 + 𝑑) 𝛼𝑌𝑡      (23)  
The competitive equilibrium satisfies the following three conditions: 
(i) The household maximizes utility (1) with respect to 𝑐𝑡, 𝑐𝑡+1, 𝑛𝑡, ℎ𝑡
𝑤,  ℎ𝑡
𝑞 ,   ℎ𝑡
𝑅 and 
ℎ𝑡
𝑒 
(ii) The firm maximizes profits with respect to 𝑁𝑡
𝑚, 𝑖
,   𝑁𝑡
𝑓, 𝑖
 and 𝐾𝑡
𝑖 
(iii) Markets cleared. In particular the asset-market clearing condition requires that 
total savings by all households (0.5𝑁𝑡) in period t are equal to total capital stock at 
the beginning of period (t+1): 0.5𝑁𝑡𝑠𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡
𝑓𝑠𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡+1 
In the balanced growth path, it can be easily verifiable that 
𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑡
 and 
𝐾𝑡
𝑁𝑡
 grow at the 
same rate as 𝑒𝑡
𝑓 . Hence the female education (that is the same as the male education is the 
key to perpetual growth.   
The growth rate of per capita GDP in steady state is
7
: 
1 + 𝛾𝑌/𝑁 =
2?̅?(1 − 𝑓ℎ𝑞∗ − 𝑓2𝑣𝑛
∗ − 𝑓3𝑛
∗𝜖𝑒∗)𝛼 (1 − ℎ𝑞∗ − (2 − 𝑓2)𝑣𝑛
∗ − 𝑛∗𝜖𝑒∗)𝛼(𝑘∗)−2𝛼𝑑𝛼Φ𝜃∗(𝑛∗)−1     
      (24) 
where the variables with * are steady state values and 𝑘𝑓∗ = (
𝐾
𝑒𝑓𝑁𝑓
)∗. 
 
3.2 Calibration and Balanced Growth Path 
 
                                           
7 See the appendix for the derivation. 
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Most parameter values are from the macroeconomics literature and Kim et al. (2014). 
Some of our parameters are derived from the calibration of our model to fit to its steady state 
values, which are derived from the average values from Korea for period 2005-2010, reported 
in the World Development Indicators by World Bank, Bank of Korea data, and Korea Time 
Use Survey (2009) data, as follows:  
(1) Fertility: 1.17 
(2) Annual per capita income growth rate: 3.6% 
(3) Net private saving rate (% of disposable income): 16.10%8 
(4) Female and male labor force participation rate: 54.43% and 75.92% 
(5) Wife-husband ratio of child rearing time: 5.19 (51 min. a day by wife and 10 min. by 
husband) 
(6) Wife-husband ratio of child education time: 3.25 (26 min. a day by wife and 8 min. 
by husband) 
f2 is derived from (2  f2) /f2 = 5.1. f3 is derived from 1/f3 = 3.25. Since the male labor 
force participation rate in our model is (1 − 𝑓1ℎ𝑡
𝑞 − 𝑓2𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑓3𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒), parameter f1 can be 
estimated from the equation: 
𝑓1ℎ𝑡
𝑞
 = 1  0.7592 −𝑓2𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑓3𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒, 
where ℎ𝑡
𝑞
, 𝑛𝑡, and 𝜖𝑡
𝑒 are endogenously determined in our model. From the calibration with 
other average values, we are able to pin down the following parameter values: 
f1 = 0.5897; 
                                           
8 Net saving rate is private saving rate (22.10%) minus depreciation (6%). 
9 Child rearing time includes time spent on washing, feeding, sending off to school, putting in bed, and 
transportation of children. Child education time includes time spent on helping homework, teaching, and reading.  
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f2 = 0.3279; 
f3 = 0.3077; 
v = 2.8099, 
 = 0.5982, 
?̅? = 4.2797, and 
?̅? = 23.6313. 
Table 3 reports the parameter values used for the calibration, and Table 4 presents the 
steady-state values of key variables in the model economy.   
 
4. Estimation of Economic Effects of Gender Inequality in Korea  
 
4.1 Output Costs of Gender Inequality 
 
We can measure the output costs of gender inequality by comparing the performances 
of the benchmark case with those of a hypothetical Korean economy with no gender 
inequality. In the hypothetical gender-equal case, males and females have the same 
opportunities and power at home, education, and labor markets.  
Table 5 illustrates the alternative steady-state of the economy with complete gender 
equality (𝑑 = 1, and 𝑓1 = 𝑓2 = 𝑓3 = 1). The table shows the values of fertility rate, female 
labor participation rate, and per capita output growth rate in the new steady-state.  
According to the simulation results, with complete gender equality, the female labor 
market participation rate increases from 54.4 to 67.5. Note that in our framework, the labor 
force participation rates for males and females are equal with no gender bias at home and 
labor market. Per capita output growth rate in the new steady-state increases to a higher value. 
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The results show that, by eliminating the gender inequality, the annual growth rates of per 
capita income can be enhanced by approximately 0.5% point, by increasing from the current 
level of 3.6%. to 4.1%.. 
According to the simulation results, in the hypothetical gender-equal economy, the 
fertility rate becomes 0.98, lower than the current value, 1.17.  
The table also presents the new steady state values reached by the Korean economy if one 
of the four inequalities or the inequalities both in home production and labor market are 
eliminated for a comparison with the case of complete gender equality. The result in column 
3, for example, shows that the complete elimination of the gender discrimination in labor 
market alone (i.e., d=1), female labor market participation rate increases from 54.4% to 
59.3%, and per capita income growth increases from 3.6% to 4.3% on average over a 
generation.  
Interestingly, removing only the gender inequality in home production (𝑓1 = 1) or 
education (𝑓3 = 1) lowers the growth rate of per capita income. The decrease in per capita 
output growth rate is mainly due to decrease in male labor market participation rate as in  
male increases time allocated to home production, child rearing and education in turn lowers 
male participation in labor market. Another growth-decreasing effect for the case of (𝑓1 =
1) comes from the increase in fertility that lowers per capita output growth. 
 
4.2. Gender-based Policies 
 
We consider the following three policies to promote gender equality.  
(i) Lower discrimination in the labor market: 𝑑 ↑ 
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(ii) Increase the time spent by a male on child rearing: f2↑ 
(iii) Lower time cost for child rearing: 𝑣 ↓ 
 
In Figure 2, we illustrate the change in three key variables of most interest—fertility 
rate, female labor market participation rate and per capita income growth—when the three 
policies are implemented.` 
Lowering the discrimination in the labor market,d , by changing the value of d from 
0.6 to 0.7 increases the growth rate of per capita output by about 0.2% point. When the 
distortion in the labor market is reduced, the female’s time allocated to market production 
significantly increases, contributing to the increase in per capita output growth. In this case, 
the fertility is lowered as females allocate more time to market production.  
If males increase time for child rearing, i.e. raising f2 (from 0.328 to 0.667) both 
female labor market participation and growth rate of per capita output increase. In this case, 
the fertility rate decreases.. 
Contrastingly, when the rearing time needed per child v is lowered from 2.810 to 2.5, the 
growth rate of per capita output decreases. Since a decrease in v implies that the cost 
involved with increasing the quantity of children is lowered, the optimal decision is to 
increase the fertility. In this case, the increase in the fertility rate dominates the increase in 
aggregate output, eventually lowering the growth rate of the per capita output. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
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The paper provides a theoretical framework that can explain the determination of 
female labor market participation, human capital accumulation and economic growth in the 
Korean economy. We employ this framework to quantitatively analyze the output cost of 
gender inequality. Our results indicate that the output cost of gender inequality is quite 
sizable. If the gender inequality is completely eliminated, the female labor force participation 
rate increases from 54.4% to 67.5%, and the annual per capita income growth rises from 3.6% 
to 4.1% on average over a generation. The increase in the economic growth rate implies that 
with the complete elimination of gender inequality per capita income will become 
approximately 15% higher over one generation. We believe that this growth enhancing effect 
of gender equality is quite comparable to that of other types of policies contemplated in the 
Korea economy such as increasing public infrastructure investment and removing 
unnecessary regulations.. 
Among various policy measures related with gender equality we contemplated in our 
study, we find that the most effective policy in terms of enhancing the growth rate of per 
capita income is eliminating the discrimination in the labor market. Policies that attempt to 
mitigate gender inequalities by reducing women’s time allocated to home production, child 
rearing and education would be helpful for enhancing growth when they are combined with 
the reduction of fundamental discrimination in the labor market and they are designed to 
minimize negative influences on male’s labor market participation.  
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Appendix 
In this appendix we derive equations needed to solve the steady states. Then we 
calculate the balanced growth rate. 
The household problem is to maximize the household utility function:  
𝑈𝑡 = 𝜂𝑐
1
1 − 𝜎
𝑐𝑡
1−𝜎 + 𝜂𝑞
1
1 − 𝜎
𝑞𝑡
1−𝜎 
+𝜂𝑒 [
1
1−𝜎
((
𝑛𝑡
2
)
𝛿
𝑒𝑡+1
𝑚 )
1−𝜎
+
1
1−𝜎
((
𝑛𝑡
2
)
𝛿
𝑒𝑡+1
𝑓 )
1−𝜎
] +
𝑝𝐴
1+𝜌
1
1−𝜎
𝑐𝑡+1
1−𝜎   (A1) 
        
Subject to 
𝑞𝑡 = ?̅?(1 + 𝑓1)
𝛾(ℎ𝑡
𝑞)𝛾𝑒𝑡
𝑓
       (A2) 
(1 − 𝜏)𝑒𝑡
𝑚(1 − 𝑓1ℎ𝑡
𝑞 − 𝑓2𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑓3𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝑤
𝑡
𝑚
 
+(1 − 𝜏)𝑒𝑡
𝑓(1 − ℎ𝑡
𝑞 − (2 − 𝑓2)𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝑤𝑡
𝑓 − 𝑐𝑡 −
𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑡+1
1+𝑟𝑡+1
= 0               (A3) 
𝑒𝑡+1
𝑚 = ?̅?(
𝜇𝐺𝑡
𝑛𝑡
𝑎𝑁𝑡/2
)𝜈1[𝑒𝑡
𝑓]1−𝜈1((1 + 𝑓3)𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝜈2     (A4) 
𝑒𝑡+1
𝑓 = ?̅?(
𝜇𝐺𝑡
𝑛𝑡
𝑎𝑁𝑡/2
)𝜈1[𝑒𝑡
𝑓]1−𝜈1((1 + 𝑓3)𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝜈2     (A5) 
 
FOCs 
(𝑐𝑡)    𝜂𝑐𝑐𝑡
−𝜎 = 𝜆 
(𝑐𝑡+1)   
𝑝𝐴
1+𝜌
𝑐𝑡+1
−𝜎 = 𝜆
𝑝𝐴
1+𝑟𝑡+1
 
=>(
𝑐𝑡+1
𝑐𝑡
)𝜎 =
1+𝑟𝑡+1
𝜂𝑐(1+𝜌)
          (A6) 
(ℎ𝑡
𝑞) 𝜂𝑞?̅?
1−𝜎𝛾(1 + 𝑓)𝛾(1−𝜎)(ℎ𝑡
𝑞)(1−𝜎)𝛾−1(𝑒𝑡
𝑓)
1−𝜎
= 𝜂𝑐𝑐𝑡
−𝜎(1 − 𝜏)(𝑓1𝑒𝑡
𝑚𝑤𝑡
𝑚 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑓𝑤𝑡
𝑓) 
           (A7) 
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(𝜖𝑡
𝑒)   𝜂𝑒 ((
nt
2
)
δ
et+1
m )
-σ
(
nt
2
)
δ
e̅ (
μGt
nt
aNt
2
)
ν
1
(et
f)
1-ν
1(1 + 𝑓3)
𝜈2ν
2
(ϵt
e)ν2-1  
+ 𝜂𝑒 ((
nt
2
)
δ
et+1
f )
−σ
(
nt
2
)
δ
e̅ (
μGt
nt
aNt
2
)
ν
1
(et
f)
1−ν
1(1 + 𝑓3)
𝜈2ν
2
(ϵt
e)ν2−1 
= η
c
ct
−σ(1 − 𝜏)[𝑒𝑡
𝑚(𝑓3𝑛𝑡)𝑤𝑡
𝑚+𝑒𝑡
𝑓(𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝑤𝑡
𝑓]             (A8) 
(𝑛𝑡)   𝜂𝑒(et+1
m )1−σ (
1
2
)
δ(1−σ)
δ(nt)
δ(1−σ)−1 + 𝜂𝑒(et+1
f )
1−σ
(
1
2
)
δ(1−σ)
δ(nt)
δ(1−σ)−1
 
= η
c
ct
−σ (1 − τ) [et
fwt
f(ϵt
e + (2 − 𝑓2)v) + 𝑒𝑡
𝑚wt
m(𝑓3ϵt
e + 𝑓2v)]  (A9) 
Since 𝑒𝑡
𝑚 = 𝐸𝑡
𝑚, 𝑒𝑡
𝑓 = 𝐸𝑡
𝑓
, ℎ𝑡
𝑚 = 𝐻𝑡
𝑚, ℎ𝑡
𝑓 = 𝐻𝑡
𝑓
, 𝑌𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑌𝑡  and 𝑁𝑡
𝑚,𝑖 =  𝑁𝑡
𝑓,𝑖 =
1
2
𝑁𝑡  
hold in equilibrium, 
𝑤𝑡
𝑓 =
2𝑑𝛼
𝑒𝑡
𝑓
ℎ𝑡
𝑤 
𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑡
          (A10) 
and  
𝑤𝑡
𝑚 =
2𝛼𝑌𝑡
𝑒𝑡
𝑚ℎ𝑡
𝑚𝑤𝑁𝑡 
=
2𝛼
𝑒𝑡
𝑓
(1−𝑓1ℎ𝑡
𝑞
−𝑓2𝑣𝑛𝑡−𝑓3𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒) 
𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑡
    (A11) 
 
Dynamics for 𝑁𝑡 
The number of adults next period 𝑁𝑡+1 is the surviving children born at time t. Since 
the number of households at time t is 
𝑁𝑡
2
 and each household gives birth to 𝑛𝑡 that will 
survive with probability 𝑝𝑐, the dynamics of 𝑁𝑡 follows: 
𝑁𝑡+1 = 𝑛𝑡
𝑁𝑡
2
         (A12) 
 
Savings in Equilibrium 
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From (7) and (8), 
𝑐𝑡 +
𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑡+1
(1+𝑟𝑡+1)
= (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐻       (A13) 
Substituting (A6) into (A13) yields, 
𝑐𝑡 +
𝑝𝐴
1+𝑟𝑡+1
(
1+𝑟𝑡+1
𝜂𝑐(1+𝜌)
)1/𝜎𝑐𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐻      (A14) 
𝑐𝑡 =
1
1+
𝑝𝐴
1+𝑟𝑡+1
(
1+𝑟𝑡+1
𝜂𝑐(1+𝜌)
)1/𝜎
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤𝑡
𝐻      (A15) 
Hence the saving rate 𝜃𝑡  is 
𝜃𝑡 = 1 −
1
1+
𝑝𝐴
1+𝑟𝑡+1
(
1+𝑟𝑡+1
𝜂𝑐(1+𝜌)
)1/𝜎
       (A16) 
Since 𝑒𝑡
𝑚 = 𝐸𝑡
𝑚 , 𝑒𝑡
𝑓 = 𝐸𝑡
𝑓
, ℎ𝑡
𝑚 = 𝐻𝑡
𝑚  and ℎ𝑡
𝑓 = 𝐻𝑡
𝑓
 hold in equilibrium, total 
gross wage income for the household becomes: 
𝑤𝑡
𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝑚ℎ𝑡
𝑚𝑤 = 𝑑−1𝑤𝑡
𝑓𝑒𝑡
𝑓ℎ𝑡
𝑤       (A17) 
Then the budget constraint for the household becomes  
𝑤𝑡
𝐻 = 𝑒𝑡
𝑚ℎ𝑡
𝑚𝑤𝑤𝑡
𝑚 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑓ℎ𝑡
𝑤𝑤𝑡
𝑓 = (1+𝑑−1)𝑒𝑡
𝑓ℎ𝑡
𝑤𝑤𝑡
𝑓
    (A18) 
Then savings 𝑆𝑡 in equilibrium are 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡(1 − 𝜏)(1+𝑑
−1)𝑒𝑡
𝑓ℎ𝑡
𝑤𝑤𝑡
𝑓 = 𝜃𝑡  Φ𝑒𝑡
𝑓(1 − ℎ𝑡
𝑞 − (2 − 𝑓2)𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝑤𝑡
𝑓
  (A19) 
where Φ = (1 − 𝜏) (1 + 𝑑−1). 
 
Interest rate 
𝑟𝑡+1 = (1 − 2𝛼)
𝑌𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡+1
        (A20) 
 
Dynamics for 𝐾𝑡 
𝐾𝑡+1   = 0.5(𝑁𝑡
𝑚 + 𝑁𝑡
𝑓)𝑆𝑡   = 𝑁𝑡
𝑓𝑆𝑡  
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= Φ𝑁𝑡
𝑓𝜃𝑡𝑒𝑡
𝑓(1 − ℎ𝑡
𝑞 − (2 − 𝑓2)𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝑤𝑡
𝑓
  
= 𝑑𝛼Φ𝜃𝑡𝑌𝑡        (A21) 
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡
= 𝑑𝛼Φ𝜃𝑡
𝑌𝑡
𝐾𝑡
         (A22) 
𝑌𝑡 = ?̅?(
𝐸𝑡
𝑚𝑁𝑡
𝑚
𝐾𝑡
)𝛼(
𝐸𝑡
𝑓
𝑁𝑡
𝑓
𝐾𝑡
)𝛼 (1 − 𝑓1ℎ𝑡
𝑞 − 𝑓2𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑓3𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝛼 (1 − ℎ𝑡
𝑞 − (2 − 𝑓2)𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝛼𝐾𝑡
                (A23) 
𝑌𝑡
𝐾𝑡
= ?̅?(
1
𝑘𝑡
𝑚)
𝛼(
1
𝑘𝑡
𝑓)
𝛼 (1 − 𝑓1ℎ𝑡
𝑞 − 𝑓2𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑓3𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝛼 (1 − ℎ𝑡
𝑞 − (2 − 𝑓2)𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝛼,  
                (A24) 
where 𝑘𝑡
𝑚 =
𝐾𝑡 
𝐸𝑡
𝑚𝑁𝑡
𝑚 and 𝑘𝑡
𝑓 =
𝐾𝑡 
𝐸𝑡
𝑓
𝑁𝑡
𝑓 
Since 𝑒𝑡+1
𝑓 = 𝑒𝑡+1
𝑚  𝑘𝑡
𝑚 = 𝑘𝑡
𝑓
.         (A25) 
𝑌𝑡
𝐾𝑡
= ?̅? (1 − 𝑓1ℎ𝑡
𝑞 − 𝑓2𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑓3𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝛼 (1 − ℎ𝑡
𝑞 − (2 − 𝑓2)𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝛼(
1
𝑘𝑡
𝑓)
2𝛼  
                (A26) 
Dynamics for Education 
From (6), (17) and (18), 
𝑒𝑡+1
𝑓 = 𝑒𝑡+1
𝑚 = ?̅? (
𝜇𝐺𝑡
𝑛𝑡
𝑎𝑁𝑡/2
)
𝜈1
(𝑒𝑡
𝑓)1−𝜈1[𝜖𝑡
𝑒]𝜈2 =
?̅? (
𝜇𝜏(1+𝑑)𝛼
𝑛𝑡
𝑎/2
)
𝜈1
(
(1−∅)−1𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑡
)
𝜈1
(𝑒𝑡
𝑓)1−𝜈1[𝜖𝑡
𝑒]𝜈2    (A27) 
By definition, 
𝑌𝑡
0.5𝑒𝑡
𝑓
𝑁𝑡
=
𝑌𝑡
𝐾𝑡
𝐾𝑡
𝑒𝑡
𝑓
𝑁𝑡
𝑓 =
𝑌𝑡
𝐾𝑡
𝑘𝑡
𝑓
     
= ?̅? (1 − 𝑓
1
ℎ𝑡
𝑞
− 𝑓
2
𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑓3𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝛼  (1 − ℎ𝑡
𝑞
− (2 − 𝑓
2
)𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝛼(𝑘𝑡
𝑓)1−2𝛼  
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         (A28) 
 
Dynamics for 𝑘𝑡
𝑓
 
𝑘𝑡+1
𝑓
=
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐸𝑡+1
𝑓
𝑁𝑡+1
𝑓 =
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐸𝑡+1
𝑓
0.5𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑡/2
=
𝑑𝛼Φ𝜃𝑡𝑌𝑡
0.25𝐸𝑡+1
𝑓
𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑡
 
=
𝑑𝛼Φ𝜃𝑡𝑌𝑡/𝑁𝑡
0.25𝑛𝑡?̅?(
𝜇𝜏(1+𝑑)𝛼
𝑛𝑡/2
)
𝜈1
(
𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑡
)
𝜈1
(𝑒𝑡
𝑓
)1−𝜈1[𝜖𝑡
𝑒]
𝜈2
 
=
𝑑𝛼Φ𝜃𝑡
[2(1−𝑏)]𝜈2 ?̅?(𝑛𝑡)1−𝜈1
(𝜇𝜏(1 + 𝑑)𝛼)−𝜈1 (
𝑌𝑡
0.5𝑒𝑡
𝑓
𝑁𝑡
)
1−𝜈1
2(𝜖𝑡
𝑒)−𝜈2 
=Γ𝜃𝑡  (
𝑌𝑡
0.5𝑒𝑡
𝑓𝑁𝑡
)
1−𝜈1
(𝜖𝑡
𝑒)
−𝜈2 
=Γ𝜃𝑡  (?̅?Γ
1
)
1−𝜈1
 (1 − 𝑓ℎ𝑡
𝑞
)
𝛼(1−𝜈1) (1 − ℎ𝑡
𝑞
− 𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)
𝛼(1−𝜈1)(𝜖𝑡
𝑒)
−𝜈2
(𝑘𝑡
𝑓
)
(1−2𝛼)(1−𝜈1)
 (A29) 
where Γ =
2𝑑𝛼Φ
?̅?(𝑛𝑡)1−𝜈1
(𝜇𝜏(1 + 𝑑)𝛼)−𝜈1 
 
Steady-State Growth Rate 
From (A11), (A21), and (A24)  
𝑌𝑡+1
𝑁𝑡+1
=
𝑌𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡+1
𝑁𝑡+1
=
𝑌𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡+1
1
𝑁𝑡+1
 
= ?̅? (1 − 𝑓1ℎ𝑡
𝑞 − 𝑓2𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑓3𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝛼 (1 − ℎ𝑡
𝑞 − (2 − 𝑓2)𝑣𝑛𝑡
− 𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝛼(
1
𝑘𝑡+1
𝑓 )
2𝛼 𝑑𝛼Φ𝜃𝑡𝑌𝑡
1
𝑛𝑡
𝑁𝑡
2
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=2?̅? (1 − 𝑓1ℎ𝑡
𝑞 − 𝑓2𝑣𝑛𝑡 − 𝑓3𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝛼 (1 − ℎ𝑡
𝑞 − (2 − 𝑓2)𝑣𝑛𝑡 −
𝑛𝑡𝜖𝑡
𝑒)𝛼(
1
𝑘𝑡+1
𝑓 )
2𝛼 𝑑𝛼Φ𝜃𝑡
1
𝑛𝑡
𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑡
 
In the steady state 
1 + 𝛾𝑌/𝑁 =
2?̅?(1 − 𝑓ℎ𝑞∗ − 𝑓2𝑣𝑛
∗ − 𝑓3𝑛
∗𝜖𝑒∗)𝛼(1 − ℎ𝑞∗ − (2 − 𝑓2)𝑣𝑛
∗ −
𝑛∗𝜖𝑒∗)𝛼(𝑘∗)−2𝛼𝑑𝛼Φ𝜃∗(𝑛∗)−1                                   (A30) 
where the variables with * are steady state values and 𝑘𝑓∗ = (
𝐾
𝑒𝑓𝑁𝑓
)∗. 
When 𝑓  increases, depending on what happens to the steady state solutions, 
particularly ℎ𝑞, the steady state growth rate can either increase or not. 
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Figure 1. Cohort Employment Rate in 2013: Male vs. Female in Korea 
 
Source: OECD (http://stats.oecd.org) 
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Figure 2. The Impact of Gender Equality Policies  
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2.2 Female’s Time Allocated to Market Production 
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2.3 Per Capita Output Growth 
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Table 1. The Global Gender Gap Index Ranking in 2013 
 
Country Overall 
Economic 
participation and 
opportunity 
Educational 
attainment 
Health and 
Survival 
Political 
empowerment 
Iceland 1 22 1 97 1 
Finland 2 19 1 1 2 
Norway 3 1 1 93 3 
Sweden 4 14 38 69 4 
Philippines 5 16 1 1 10 
Germany 14 46 86 49 15 
United States 23 6 1 33 60 
Sri Lanka 55 109 48 1 30 
Singapore 58 12 105 85 90 
Thailand 65 50 78 1 89 
China 69 62 81 133 59 
Vietnam 73 52 95 132 80 
Bangladesh 75 121 115 124 7 
Indonesia 95 103 101 107 75 
India 101 124 120 135 9 
Malaysia 102 100 73 75 121 
Japan 105 104 91 34 118 
Korea, Rep. 111 118 100 75 86 
Pakistan 135 135 129 124 64 
 
Source: Bekhouch, Y., Hausmann, R., Tyson, L. D., & Zahidi, S. (2013, September). The 
Global Gender Gap Report 2013. 
  
37 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Workers by Employment Types 
 
Sex Year Total Employer Own 
account 
workers 
Unpaid 
family 
workers 
Regular Temporary Daily 
Female 1990 100.0 2.7 16.0 24.5 21.4 22.5 12.9 
1995 100.0 3.3 16.0 21.1 25.5 24.2 9.8 
2000 100.0 3.0 16.2 19.2 19.1 28.5 13.9 
2005 100.0 3.5 15.4 14.0 25.6 30.2 11.3 
2010 100.0 3.3 12.9 10.9 34.5 30.0 8.4 
2011 100.0 3.2 12.4 10.7 37.1 28.7 7.9 
Male 1990 100.0 9.0 25.4 2.5 40.7 14.1 8.3 
1995 100.0 10.2 22.4 1.7 44.4 13.1 8.1 
2000 100.0 9.6 24.1 2.0 38.1 17.1 9.2 
2005 100.0 10.0 22.8 1.3 41.1 16.4 8.5 
2010 100.0 8.4 20.3 1.3 47.9 15.1 7.0 
2011 100.0 8.4 20.3 1.2 49.5 15.0 6.8 
 
Source: Statistics Korea, Annual Report on the Economically Active Population Survey. 
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Table 3. Calibrated Parameters 
 
Parameter Value Description 
Households 
ρ 0.5982 Annual discount rate 
σ 0.8 Inverse of elasticity of substitution 
𝑃𝐴 0.987 Survival probability 
δ 1.05 Preference parameter for number of children 
𝜂𝑒 0.2 Preference parameters for children’s 
education 
𝜂𝑞 12 Family preference parameter for home 
production output 
𝜂𝑐 3.5 Preference parameter for consumption 
𝑣 2.8099  
Home output 
γ 0.122 Curvature of production function 
f1 0.5897 Bargaining power of a female in home 
production 
f2 0.3279 Bargaining power of a female in child rearing 
f3 0.3077 Bargaining power of a female in child rearing 
?̅? 23.6313  
𝜒 0.8  
Market output 
α 0.4 Elasticity with respect to (wrt) labor input 
d 0.6 Gender bias in the workplace 
?̅? 1  
 
Human capital 
𝜐1 0.4 Elasticity wrt public spending in education 
𝜐2 0.3 Elasticity wrt public-private ratio 
   
?̅? 4.2797  
Government 
τ 0.163 Tax rate on marketed output 
μ 0.39 Education spending efficiency parameter 
∅ 3 Factor of unproductive, exogenous 
government expenditure to educational 
expenditure 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
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Table 4. Steady State Solutions  
Variables Value Description 
𝑝𝑐𝑛 1.17 Fertility rate (𝑛 = 1.17) 
ℎ𝑚 0.7592 Labor force participation rate of males  
ℎ𝑤 0.5443 Labor force participation rate of females 
𝜃 0.1610 Net private savings rate  
𝛾𝑌/𝑁 1.889 Per capita growth rate (= 1.0360
30
 – 1) 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
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Table 5. Steady-state Values for the Hypothetical Cases with Gender Equality 
 Fertility Female labor  
participation rate 
(%) 
Per capita output  
growth rate 
Current level 1.17 54.43 0.0360 
New steady-states    
Complete gender equality  
d = 1, f1 = f2 = f3 = 1  
 
0.98 
 
67.51 
 
0.0406 
Gender equality by category 
d = 1, 
d = 1  
d=1 
 
0.97 
 
59.30 
 
0.0434 
f1 = 1  1.29 62.24 0.0346 
f2 = 1  1.10 56.50 0.0378 
f3 = 1  1.08 55.43 0.0345 
d = 1, f1 = 1 1.04 64.84 0.0420 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
 
